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Abstract
Three critical cases, involving asymmetric and symmetric cases, in
the sequential stages of the n-player repeated auctions are analyzed and
compared. These cases might arise in a process of sequential, identical
or equivalent auctions, where the auction result may reveal information
about the strength or competitiveness of the participants. The behaviours
of diﬀerent players are characterized. Generally a player bids more aggres-
sively when facing a strong player rather than a weak player. However
a player favours competing with a weak one rather than a strong one.
By applying the concept of Conditional Stochastic Dominance, revenues
of players and the seller between the three stages are compared. It is
proved that in this sequential process the information structure of the
auctions changes and the seller’s revenue increases. Finally, this n-player
asymmetric auction model can also be used to compare the revenues be-
tween high-bid and open auctions and especially the results ﬁrst derived
by Maskin and Riley (2000) in two-player case are proved to be valid in
the n-player case.
Keywords: Asymmetric auction; Revenue comparison
JEL Classiﬁcation: C72; D44; D82
1 INTRODUCTION
In this paper we discuss the transformation of information structure during
sequential stages of repeated auctions. The private information of the winners
∗Email contact: heng.qiao@konstanz.de (Heng Qiao), erwin.amann@uni-due.de (Erwin
Amann)
1in previous stages releases gradually, which changes the information structure
and the behaviours of players in later stages of auctions. By the analysis of the
three typical and critical cases during all stages of the repeated auctions, this
paper shows the changes of information structure and behaviours of diﬀerent
players. Firstly we assume that each stage of the repeated auctions is a sealed-
bid ﬁrst-price auction for a single and equivalent item, and assume that the
ability (or the bidding cost) of any participant remains the same throughout all
stages of the sequential auctions. In real world, this indicates that the process of
the repeated auctions is restricted in a limited period so that the ability (or cost
structure) of any player changes not much. Technically it permits the ability
parameter of any player to be a constant through the analysis of all the stages.
Now we introduce the three cases of the repeated auctions. The ﬁrst stage
of the repeated auctions, as analyzed in Case 1, shows a symmetric case, where
no private information about the valuation of the item is known except that
any one’s valuation of the item can be seen as randomly derived from a com-
mon distribution. After the ﬁrst round or when the same auction repeats for
some time, the information of the winner’s valuation of the item is released
and the situation described by Case 2 emerges. In this stage, valuation of the
winners in previous stages can be seen as drawn from a stochastically dominant
distribution, comparing to the common distribution. After some times of the
repeat, more information is released about the group of winners in the previous
auctions. In the ﬁnal round, weak players, knowing the strong players’ private
informtion, withdraw automatically or are ruled out of the ﬁnal list by the seller.
Then the Case 3 emerges. Speciﬁcally we analyze the 2-player case in Case 3.
In the following we describle the three cases in details.
Case 1: Symmetric n-player Case There are n players, participating in the
sealed-bid auction for a single item. Any of the n players, i = 1,2,...,n, has
private information on the valuation of the item, vi. From other players’
perspective, it is a random variable ˜ vi with c.d.f. F(·) on the support
[v
¯
i, ¯ vi], 0 ≤ v
¯
i < ¯ vi. In other words, all the n players are symmetric
since anyone ’s valuation of the item is distributed according to the same
function F(·) on the same support. Assume that F(·) is twice continuously
diﬀerentiable on (v
¯
i, ¯ vi] and the density function F0(·) is strictly positive
on [v
¯
i, ¯ vi]. Therefore, it is easy to know that there exists a symmetric
equilibrium, characterized by player i’s bidding strategy bi(vi), which can
be easily derived explicitly.
We ssume that the sequential auctions are eﬃcient, i.e. in any of the auctions
the seller selects the strongest player of all participants as the winner. The
process of the sequential auctions will reach the end of Case 1, if only the
winner’s information is revealed publicly, i.e. the distribution of her valuation
is known by all other players. Therefore, the auctions in Case 1 may repeat
for more than one round until the above critical information of the winner is
released. Additionally, we assume that in Case 1 the distribution function is
labelled as Fi(·), which indicates that in this case the seller see all players as
2’weak player’. We have F(·) = Fi(·). As a counterpart of the this situation, we
conceive a symmetric auction with all strong players, in which the distribution
function is labelled as F1(·). This situation with purely strong players is only
used for equilibrium and revenue comparison in later sections.
Case 2: Asymmetric n-player Case In this case there exist one strong player
and n − 1 normal players. Without loss of generality, the strong player
is labelled as Player 1, whose valuation stochastically dominates those of
other players. In other words, the strong player and other players are
distributed according to the c.d.f. F1(·) and Fi(·), respectively.
Comparing with the denotation in Case 1, we have F(·) = Fi(·), which
indicates that for n−1 normal players the distribution function does not change
while the information of the strong player’s distribution is revealed in this case
for all participants.
Case 3 emerges, when the information of the second strong player releases in
the previous auctions. The following Case 3 is a two-player ﬁnal round, where
the ﬁnal winner is selected. Generally there are several reasons, which may
expain why other players do not participate any longer. One possible reason is
that when knowing the information of the two strong players, other weak players
are deferred from participating the later round any longer because participating
in the following stages of auctions is much less or no more proﬁtable for them.
However, this is not a suﬃcient condition for all other players to draw oﬀ. In
the real world the seller often speciﬁes certian rules to select the ﬁnal list of
players in order to maximize seller’s revenue. Theoretically, many literatures
on auction and contests indicate that for a large of contests and tournaments
the optimal number of contestants is two (see Fullerton and McAfee (1999)[2],
Gradstein and Konrad(1999)[3] ). Therefore, this paper speciﬁes that in the
ﬁnal Case 3, only two strong players are ﬁnal-listed.
Case 3: Final Round — 2-player Case In this case there are only two
players active while other (n − 2) players have already drawn oﬀ or been
ruled out from the game. We label the two players as Player 1 and Player
2, whose valuations of the item are drawn from c.d.f. F1(·) and F2(·),
respectively. In this ﬁnal round, there are two possible situations, i.e.
one symmetric situation and one asymmetric situation. In the asymmet-
ric situation, the valuation of Player 1 stochastically dominates that of
Player 2. In the symmetric situation, two strong players are in the ﬁ-
nal round, whose valuations are both drawn from the same distribution
function F1(·).
Additionally, we conceive a symmetric situation involving two weak players,
which can be seen as a counterpart of the two-strong-player situation and exists
just for the convenience and completeness of analysis and comparison. This is
not a real situation in the sequential auctions because if all the players are all
weak ones, Case 2 and case 3 will not emerge.
3In the real world, online auctions attract much attention of researchers. The
results in this paper is helpful to explain phenomena in repeated online trans-
actions and especially the repeated procurement auctions. On the other hand,
from certain perspective some of the sequential stages in repeated auctions share
similar information structure with multiple rounds of contests or tournaments.
The change of information structure discussed here is useful to explain players’
behaviour in diﬀerent stages of tournament. Generally this paper prove that
in a n-player case, a player will bid more aggressively when facing strong play-
ers rather than weak ones. For the designer or the seller, they obtain higher
revenue, when players with higher abilities compete with each other.
Theoretically, this paper pay much attention on the anylysis of the asym-
metric situations of auctions. Auction literature considering asymmetry is not
so rich compared to other auction ﬁelds (see review [4] at pp. 236–237). In
1980s, some important studies assuming asymmetry developed the approach of
marginal revenues and obtained important comparison results (see [9], [1] and
[5]). As written By Klemperer[4], the large variety of diﬀerent possible kinds of
asymmetries makes it diﬃcult to develop general results, but Maskin and Riley
[6] make large strides, in which the concept of Conditional stochastic Dominance
is applied in the analysis of asymmetric 2-player case, which solves the problem
of revenue comparison between high-bid and open auction eﬀectively.
In this paper, a n-player asymmetric auction is established and analyzed.
Since the advantage of CSD is on revenue comparison, we apply the approach
by Maskin and Riley (2000)[6] and extend the 2-player results of Maskin and
Riley (2000) to n-player case.This paper gives the general results for n-player
asymmetric auctions and makes revenue comparisons from the perspectives of
both the players and the seller in the background of three cases. Finally, the
results of revenue comparison between high-bid auction and open auction are
generalized from 2-player case to the n-player case.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 analyzes the equilib-
rium bidding functions in the three cases and under the condition of CSD Sec-
tion 3 makes further analysis and comparison of the equilibrium distributions
and characterize the equilibrium inverse bid functions in various symmetric and
asymmetric cases. Section 4 gives the players’ equilibrium revenues and the
seller’s revenues in various symmetric and asymmetric cases. The seller’s rev-
enues in these cases are compared and ranked. In this section, the players’ and
seller’s bahaviours in the three cases analyzed in previous sections are explained
from the perspective of revenue comparison. Section 5 makes comparison be-
tween the revenue in open auction and that in ﬁrst-price sealed-bid auction
in various asymmetric n-player situations of auctions. This part theoretically
complete the analysis of asymmetric auctions. Section 6 concludes.
42 EQUILIBRIUM BIDDING
2.1 Asymmetry, imperfect, 1, N − 1
Without loss of generality, buyer 1 is assumed to be the buyer whose valuation
is publicly known to stochastically dominate that of the others by the concept










= Pr{˜ vi < x|˜ vi < y}, (2.1)
from which it is easy to obtain,
Corollary 1 CSD implies
Fi(v) > F1(v), for all v ∈ (v
¯











for all x < y in (v
¯
i, ¯ v1) (2.4)
Notice (2.2) means that buyer 1’s valuation ﬁrst order stochastically domi-
nates that of any others. And (2.2) implies (2.3). (2.4) indicates the monotony
of increasing for F1(v)/Fi(v).
More speciﬁcally in this model, combined with the results from CSD we have





























(a) F1 = Fi = 0










Fi(v) > 0, for all v ∈ [γ, ¯ v1].
(2.5)
We assume that there exists an equilibrium in which buyer 1 uses the bidding
strategy b1(v) and others use a symmetric bidding strategy bi(v), i = 2,3...n.




U1(b|v1) ≡ (v1 − b)Prob(b > bi(vi),i = 2,3...n)





Ui(b|vi) ≡ (vi − b)Prob(b > bj(vj),i 6= j)Prob(b > b1)








Rather than solving directly for the equilibrium bid functions, it is convenient
to deal with inverse bid functions, which identify for some equilibrium bid the
bidders’ true valuation. Note that φi(b) = b
−1
i (b),i = 1,2,...n. We then have

U1(b|v1) = (v1 − b)F
n−1
i (φi(b))




Taking logarithms and diﬀerentiating by b, we obtain the ﬁrst-order con-
dition FOC. Similar to the case of Maskin and Riley (2000 and 2003), under
certain conditions, that v
¯
1 must not be much larger relative to ¯ vi, there are
unique minimum and maximum winning bids b∗ and b∗ for which there exists a






















(All functions φi and φ0
i are evaluated at b for all b ∈ [b∗,b∗].)Satisfying the
boundary conditions




















1 − b)Fi(b)},φi(b∗) = b∗.





where bi(·) is buyer i’ equilibrium bid as a function of his valuation.
2.2 Symmetry, imperfect, N
Now we go back to consider the initial situation of the repeated auction, when
all buyers’ values are assumed to be symmetrically distributed. The random
variable ˜ v possibly has a higher or lower c.d.f, i.e. F1(·) or Fi(·), which indicates
that there are possibly two participation pools. Actually, before a buyer enter
any of the two pools, he knows which one he chooses to enter. Let yi(b) be the















6The subscript i = 1 implies that it is a pool of higher ability and i > 1
implies a pool of lower ability.









Multiply both sides of the equation by F
n−2
i (yi), it is easy to obtain
yidF
n−1
i (yi) = bdF
n−1
i (yi) + F
n−1
i (yi)db
Let ¯ bi(v) be the corresponding equilibrium bid function, i.e. the inverse of











It follows immediately that in symmetric equilibrium a buyer’s maximum
possible bid is equal to the mean valuation







i (yi) = E{˜ vi} ≡ µi
From (2.2), we then have
µ1 > µi i = 2,3,...,n. (2.13)
We rewrite (2.12) in a usually used form in literature










i = 1,2,...,n. (2.14)
From CSD, we know
¯ bi(v) ≤ ¯ b1(v), for all v ∈ (v
¯
1, ¯ vi), i = 2,3,...,n. (2.15)
2.3 Asymmetry, perfect, 2, N − 2
Finally, there are only two active buyers left in this auction, because other
buyers all leave the auction when information of the two strongest buyers is
released from former auction, which indicates that other weaker buyers never
proﬁt by participation. Therefore, the repeated auction shrinks to a two-player
asymmetric case.
Actually, the ﬁnal situation may be either an imperfect Information case or
a perfect Information case. Such cases are analyzed respectively here.
72.3.1 Imperfect Information case
As assumed in the Introduction, we still assume that this speciﬁc information
is in the sense of ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance and, more speciﬁcally, the
valuations of the two strong buyers ﬁrst-order stochastically dominate that of the
other buyers and the valuations of the strongest buyer ﬁrst-order stochastically
dominates that of the second strongest one.

U1(b|v1) = (v1 − b)F2(φ2(b))
U2(b|v2) = (v2 − b)F1(φ1(b)) (2.16)
3 ANALYSIS
Deﬁne
pi(b) ≡ Fi(φi(b)), i = 1,2,...,n.
Hi(·) ≡ F
−1
i (·), i = 1,2,...,n.
Therefore, φi(b) = Hi(pi(b)). We have stochastic dominance, H1(p) > Hi(p) for



















Similarly, for the symmetric equilibrium, we deﬁne










The following results, i.e. Lemma 1, Proposition 1, Corollary 3 and Propo-
sition 2 are the n-player version of the 2-player results in Maskin and Riley
(2000)[6], (speciﬁcally the extension of Lemma 3.2, Proposition 3.3, Corollary
3.4 and Proposition 3.5, respectively.) See proofs of the results in appendix,
which follow similar approach of Maskin and Riley (2000). Therefore, these
results apply to both 2-player case and n-player case well. In other words, the
following two Propositions in this section apply both to Case 2 and to Case 3
and explain the behaviours in various situations.
Lemma 1 If



















then there exists δ > v
¯
such that for all b ∈ [v
¯
,δ]
81. πi(b) > π1(b);
2. pi(b) > p1(b);
3. πi(b) > pi(b);
4. p1(b) > π1(b).
in which i = 2,3,...,n.
Proposition 1 Comparison of equilibrium bid distributions. Given CSD, then
1. πi(b) > π1(b), For all b ∈ (v
¯
1,µ1);
2. pi(b) > p1(b), For all b ∈ (b∗,b∗) ;
3. πi(b) > p1(b), For all b ∈ (b∗,b∗) ;
4. pi(b) > π1(b), For all b ∈ (b∗,b∗) .
in which i = 2,3,...,n.
Proposition 1 explains the behaviours of diﬀerent players facing diﬀerent
situations in the n-player case, i.e. Case 3. The ﬁrst result of Proposition 1
is obvious. Comparing two symmetric auctions invloving purely strong players
and weak players, respectively, the equilibrium bid distribution of the strong
player stochastically donimates that of the weak player. The second result
of Proposition 1 compares the behaviours of diﬀerent players in asymmetric
case and indicates that the equilibrium bid distribution of the strong player
stochastically donimates that of the weak player.
The third result of Proposition 1 compares a asymmetric situation with a
symmetric situation involving only weak players and characterizes the behaviour
of weak players, i.e. if a weak player faces a strong buyer rather than another
weak player, she responds with a more aggressive bid distribution in the sense
of stochastic dominance.
The fourth result of Proposition 1 compares an asymmetric situation with a
symmetric situation involving only weak players and characterizes the behaviour
of the strong player, i.e. if a strong buyer faces a weak player rather than another
strong player, she will respond with a less aggressive bid distribution.
Since this proposition can applies to Case 3, it is easy to conclude that for the
designer of the auction it is more proﬁtable that the ﬁnal round of the sequential
auctions will turn out to be two strong players, because this result implies that
the two strong players will bid more aggressively than other situations.
Corollary 3 Given CSD, the following inequality holds
µi ≤ b∗ ≤ µ1,
with at least one strict inequality and i = 2,3,...,n.
9Proof. Suppose b∗ < µi. From (2.10), 1 = p1(b∗) = πi(µi) > πi(b∗) and so
p1(b) > πi(b) for b near b∗, a contradiction of Proposition 1 part 3. A similar
contradiction follows from b∗ ≥ µ1. k
Proposition 2 Characterization of equilibrium inverse bid functions. Given
CSD,
1. yi(b) ≥ y1(b), For all b ∈ (v
¯
1,µ1);
2. φ1(b) > φi(b), For all b ∈ (b∗,b∗) ;
3. yi(b) > φi(b), For all b ∈ (b∗,b∗) ;
4. φ1(b) > y1(b), For all b ∈ (v
¯
1,b∗) .
in which i = 2,3,...,n.
By the comparison of equilibrium inverse bid functions, this Proposition
characterizes the bidding behaviours of diﬀerent players in various situations
of the n-player case, i.e. Case 2. The ﬁrst result of Proposition 2 compares
two symmetric auctions invloving purely strong players and weak players, re-
spectively, and indicates that the weak player shades her bid further below her
valuation than the strong player.
The second result of Proposition 2 characterizes the behaviours of diﬀer-
ent players in asymmetric equilibrium, i.e. in the asymmetric equilibrium, the
strong player shades her bid further below her valuation than the weak player.
The third result of Proposition 2 compares a asymmetric situation with a sym-
metric situation involving only weak players and characterizes the behaviour
of weak players, i.e. if a weak player faces a strong player rather than a weak
player he will bid more aggressively (closer to her valuation). The fourth result
of Proposition 2 indicates that if a strong player faces a weak player rather than
a strong player she will bid less aggressively. As a conclusion of the above two
Propositions, in general a player bids more aggressively, when she faces strong
players rather than weak players.
From Proposition 1 and Part 3, Part 4 of Proposition 2, we obtain the
following Corollary.
Corollary 4 For b ∈ (v
¯
1,b∗), we have
πi(b) > pi(b) > p1(b) > π1(b).
in which i = 2,3,...,n.
This Corollary can be seen as a conclusion of the above two Propositions
and gives the basic principle of diﬀerent players’ behaviours in Case 2 and Case
3 in the sense of stochastic dominance.
104 REVENUE COMPARISON
4.1 Players’ Equilibrium Revenue
For any player i, i = 1,2,...,n, denote UAs
i (v,F1,Fi) as buyer i’s expected equi-
librium revenue from an auction with asymmetric players when his reservation
price is v. The strong player’s reservation price is distributed according to F1
and other symmetric buyers’ reservation prices are distributed according to Fi),
i = 2,...,n.
(1) Player’s revenue in asymmetric n-player case
Note i = 2,3,...,n, and we have,
RAs




i (b)(v − b);
and
RAs




i (b)p1(b)(v − b).
(2) Player’s revenue in symmetric n-player case






1 (b)(v − b) = π
n−1
1 (¯ b1)(v −¯ b1).
In a symmetric auction with all weak players, we have
RS




i (b)(v − b) = π
n−1
i (¯ bi)(v −¯ bi).
where i = 2,3,...,n.
From Corollary 4, it is easy to obtain (see proof in Appendix)
Proposition 3 We rank the expected players’ revenues of the above asymmetric
and symmetric auctions as
RAs




i (v,F1,Fi) < RS
i (v,Fi,Fi).
This proposition implies that for a strong player it is more proﬁtable to com-
pete with weak players in an asymmetric auction than to compete with strong
players in a symmetric auction. And it is the same for a weak player to pre-
fer competing with less strong opponents. Since Proposition 1 and Proposition
2 indicate that a player bids more aggressively when she faces strong players
rather than weak ones, it is easy to know that it is more proﬁtable to compete
with weak players than with strong ones.
114.2 Expected seller revenue
(1) Expected seller revenue in asymmetric n-player case
Any of the strong players’ expected payment, if he bids b ≥ b∗, is bF
n−1
i (φi(b)).











1 note the expected seller revenue from the strong player in the
asymmetric model and i = 2,3...,n.
Any of the weak players’ expected payment, if she bids b ≥ b∗, is bF
n−2
i (φi(b))F1(φ1(b)).









































(2) Expected seller revenue in symmetric n-player case

















































































In the context described in the introduction, player 2’s information is newly
emerged and following the reasoning of Corollary 4, we denote p2(b) = F2(φ2(b))
and assume that pi(b) > p2(b) > p1(b). Concluding all the results above, we
then have the following Proposition in the next subsection.
(4) Comparison and Explanations of diﬀerent situations
From the results from the above subsection (1), (2), (3) and (4), we have
the following proposition.
Proposition 4 If the diﬀerence between players’ valuations is small, i.e. the
following diﬀerences
1. the diﬀerence between integral upper bounds b∗, µ1 and µi





are not big enough to change the signs of the following inequalities, then we have
RS1 > RAs2 > RAs > RSi
where i = 2,3,...,n.
We can rewrite the above result as
RS1 > RCase3 > RCase2 > RCase1
Speciﬁcally, from the conceived case, where there are n strong players, the
seller obtains the highest revenue. However, it is not a real case. It is obvious
that following the sequential stages of the repeated auctions, i.e. from Case 1,
Case 2 to Case 3, the seller increases her revenue. Intuitively the seller hopes the
participants to be stronger, and meanwhile hopes that the strong participants to
be more. In the following we discuss the inﬂuence of the information structure
to the seller’s revenue in this sequential process. The following analysis is from
the perspective of the seller, though the seller does not have special information
more than a normal player, i.e. the seller has the information as much as it is
released from the process of the repeated auctions.
13In Case 1, all the players are symmetric and the seller does not know private
information of the participants. Proposition 4 tells that the seller’s revenue
in Case 1 is the lowest among all the cases. When some private information,
i.e. the type and distribution of the winner, releases, the symmetric situation
of auction in Case 1 will change to be a asymmetric case as in Case 2. The pri-
vate information which can ascertain the winner’s distribution can increase the
seller’s revenue. That explains why sellers or auctioneers always have incentive
to know more information about critical participants.
The seller or the public assumes that Case 1 is a symmetric case and all
players’ valuations are assumed to be distributed according to the function Fi(·).
Since the distribution function Fi(·) describes the weak players’ valuations and
their behaviours, the seller in Case 1 holds a pessimistic assumption that all
the unkown players are supposed to be weak players. This perspective implie
that the seller is risk averse, because she does not take account of the risk what
kind of bid distribution the winner will hold, and how high the winner will bid.
The Case 2 emerges when the winer’s distribution information is released
from previous auctions. At this time the seller revised his knowledge of the
participants. In this asymmetric auction, for the seller, there is a upper bound
of distribution F1(·) and a lower bound of distribution Fi(·). The seller can
apply any distribution function between the two distributions to describe any
of the unkown players. However, the seller applies her pessimistic perspective for
all unkown players again, i.e. except the winner others’ valuation are assumed
to be distributed with Fi(·). From Proposition 4, it is easy to know that the
seller’s revenue falls in the interval [RS
i ,RS
1]. As a partly conclusion, under the
assumption that the seller has no special information available in Case 1 and
believes that all players are weak ones, from Proposition 4, the revenue of Case
2 increases, comparing with that of Case 1.
The repeated auctions move on to Case 3, when the information of the second
winner is publicly released. At this case, the revenue of the seller reaches to the
peak of all the cases in the repeated auctions, though the seller obtains an ideally
high revenue in a conceived case, where purely strong players participate. In
between, we emphasize that how much the second winner values the item is
more important than the ﬁrst winner does, because this speciﬁc value beneﬁts
the seller more, so that the seller waits until its emergence for the longest time,
i,e, duration of all the sequential process.
As a conclusion, when the seller have no special information in the original
Case 1, following the process of the repeated auction, the revenue of seller always
increases. Therefore, the seller has an incentive to wait until the releasing of
the information of the second winner. Otherwise, if the seller obtians important
information in the middle of the process, i.e. when she expects that no stronger
player emerges any longer, she will try to interrupt the process of the repeated
auctions and does not wait any longer. For instance, at Case 2, if the seller
knows that there exists no second strongest buyer but weak ones, he will stop
holding another auction in the same pool because beginning another ﬁrst-stage
auction in another pool is more beneﬁcial than holding one in the same pool
hopelessly. Similarly, at the second stage, if the seller knows that there exists no
14second strongest player but weak ones, he will just quit after the strongest one
emerges. Therefore, knowing more information of the players’ is much critical
for the seller.
5 RANKING OF OPEN AUCTION AND FIRST-
PRIZE SEALED-BID AUCTION
In this section, we follow the Section 4 in Maskin and Riley (2000)[6] and
extend the 2-player results into n-player case. This additional work is just to
theretically complete the revenue comparison for n-player asymmetric auctions.
Let UH
i (v,Fa,Fb) be the buyer’s expected equilibrium surplus from the ﬁrst-
prize sealed-bid auction (here noted as high-bid auction), when i = 1,2,...,n,
buyer’s reserve price is v, and the reservation prices of the strongest and other
buyers’ are distributed according to Fa and Fb,respectively. And let UH
i (v,Fa,Fb)
be the buyer’s expected equilibrium surplus from the open auction.
UH




i (b)(v − b) = p
n−1
i (b1(v))(v − b1(v));
UH




i (b)p1(b)(v − b) = p
n−2
i (bi)p1(bi)(v − bi);
where b1(·) and bi(·) are the stronger’s and others’ equilibrium bid functions
in the high-bid auction when the distributions are (F1,Fi), respectively.
Lemma 2 In the sealed high bid auction, the expected seller revenue from bidder
i, i = 2,3,...,n is
RAs



































































i (v)d[v(1 − Fi(v))]






, the minimum bid, i.e.
b∗, is equal to v
¯
. From the above Lemmas, the diﬀerence in expected revenue
from the two auctions is
D ≡ RAs
i + (n − 1)RAs
i − RO




b∗ (n − 1)[1 − F1(Q(v))]F
n−2




b∗ (n − 1)[1 − F1(v)]F
n−2
i (v)(1 − Fi(v))dv





i (n − 1){[1 − F1(Q(v))](Q(v) − v)F0
i(v) − (1 − Fi(v))[F1(Q(v)) − F1(v)]}dv
(5.1)
Since the above expression is similar to that obtained by Maskin and Riley
(2000)[6] in two-player case, following the same rationale, we obtain similar
conclusions on the comparison between high-bid and open auctions.
Proposition 5 High-bid auction superior for distribution shifts. Assume that
(1)Distribution shifts: given a < ¯ vi − v
¯
i, for all v ∈ [v
¯
i, ¯ vi + a],
F1 =
(
0, v < v
¯
i + a;























Then the high-bid auction generates higher expected revenue than does the
open auction.
Proposition 6 High-bid auction superior for distribution stretches.
(1)Distribution stretches: For λ ∈ (0,1), let the strong buyer have distribu-
tion F1(v), where v ∈ [v
¯
i, ¯ v1](¯ vi < ¯ v1), such that
F1(v) =
(
λFi(v), v ∈ [v
¯
i, ¯ vi];





i) = λ, G(v
¯
1) = 1, and for all v ∈ [v
¯













Fi(v) < 0 on [v
¯
i, ¯ vi].
Then the high-bid auction generates more expected revenue than the open
auction.
16Proposition 7 Open auction superior for shifts of probability mass to the lower
end point. Suppose the strong buyer’s valuation ˜ v1 is distributed on according
to F1(v), v ∈ [v
¯
, ¯ v1] where F1(v
¯




1−F1(v) is increasing. Buyer i’s
valuation ˜ vi is distributed so that, for all v ∈ [v
¯
, ¯ v1]. its density at v is a fraction
θ(v) ∈ (0,1) with θ0(v) ≥ 0 of F0















Then, the open auction generates higher revenue than the high-bid auction.
6 CONCLUSION
Diﬀerent reasons can incur asymmetric behavior of players in competitive ac-
tivities. Most literatures focus on two main reasons: (1) players diﬀer in risk
attitudes, or (2) players diﬀer in their valuations respectively cost, or (3) valu-
ations are chosen from diﬀerent distributions, due to asymmetry between par-
ticipants. There are however more aspects of asymmetry, for instance players
might diﬀer in entry costs, in availabilities of information or options or budgets
they face. In this paper we only consider aspects (2) and (3) and still are far
from completing all the relevant varieties. One of the gaps between theoretical
results and its practical applications is superﬁcially symmetry and asymmetry,
especially in auction theory and its applications. By establishing a repeated
contest, this paper tries to explain the evolutionary process from symmetry to
asymmetry and compare the diﬀerent stages of them. We see symmetry as a
situation, where the seller lacks in information. When the process goes on and
more information about players, especially the winners, is released, the strong
player can be identiﬁed and, therefore, the auctions later on turn out to be
asymmetric. In this sense auction, as an economic institute, functions as a
cognitive or learning mechanism for seller to obtain information relative to his
interests. One of the important results obtained in this paper shows the validity
that further information about players, especially those with higher valuation,
are worth holding an auction to obtain optimal revenues for the seller.
References
[1] Bulow, Jeremy and John Roberts, (1989), Simple Economics of Optimal
Auctions, The Journal of Political Economy. 97(5), 1060–1090.
[2] Fullerton, Richard L. , R. Preston McAfee, (1999), Auctioning Entry into
Tournaments, Journal of Political Economy, 107(3), 573–605.
17[3] Gradstein, Mark and Kai A. Konrad, (1999), Orchestrating Rent Seeking
Contest, The Economic Journal, 109, 536–545.
[4] Klemperer, Paul, (1999), Auction Theory: A Guide to the literrature, Jour-
nal of Economic Surveys, 13(3), 227–286.
[5] McAfee, R. Preston and John McMillan, Government Procurement and
International Trade, Journal of International Economics, 26, 291–308.
[6] Maskin, Eric and John Riley, (2000), Asymmetric Auctions, Review of
Economic Studies, 67(3), 413-438.
[7] Maskin, Eric and John Riley, (2003), Uniqueness in Sealed High Bid Auc-
tions, Games and Economic Behavior, 45, 395–409.
[8] Maskin, Eric and John Riley, 2000, Equilibrium in Sealed High Bid Auc-
tions, Review of Economic Studies, 67, 439–454.
[9] Myerson, Roger B., (1981), Optimal Auction Design, Mathematics of Op-
erations Research, 6 (1), 58–73.
[10] Riley, John G., (1989), Expected Revenue from Open and Sealed Bid Auc-
tions, The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 3 (3), 41–50.
[11] Riley, John G. and William F. Samuelson, (1981), Optimal Auctions, The


































in which i = 2,3,...,n.



































,for F1 > 0 and Fi > 0.































































i.e. the bracketed expression in (A.3) is strictly positive.









) = 0, i = 1,2,...,n, applying















































in which i = 2,3,...,n.



















, i = 1,2,...,n. (A.6)
Taking the logarithm of the ﬁrst equation of (A.1), diﬀerentiating, and using



















− (n − 1)φ00
1,
we obtain the second equation in (A.7).
Meanwhile, diﬀerentiating the second equation of (A.1), taking use of the





i − 1)(φi − v
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i − 1)(φ1 − v
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i + (n − 1)φ00
1 = 0.
(A.7)
19in which i = 2,3,...,n.













































in which i = 1,2,...,n.
For the convenience of comparison of φ00
i and y00









































in which i = 2,3,...,n.








in which i = 2,3,...,n.
Similarly, for the convenience of comparison of φ00
1 and y00













































in which i = 1.





























with (A.6) and (A.9),(A.10) , part 3 and part 4 of Lemma 1 holds.































), from (A.4) we have F00
1 > F00
i , which contradicts (2.2). k
Proof of Proposition 1
To establish part 1, ﬁrstly from (2.13), 1 = πi(b) > π1(b) for all b ∈
[µi,µ1). Contrary to Part 1, we assume that there is some ˆ b ∈ [v
¯
1,µi] such
that πi(b)/π1(b) = 1. We will show that πi(b)/π1(b) is increasing at ˆ b. Since
H1(p) > Hi(p) for all p ∈ (0,1), π1 ≥ πi implies that H1(π1) ≥ H1(πi) > Hi(πi).
































> 0, at b = ˆ b.
It follows that, for some δ > 0,
π1(b) > πi(b), for all b ∈ (ˆ b − δ,ˆ b). (A.11)
Let δ be the biggest value for which (A.11) holds. If ˆ b − δ > v
¯
1, then
π1(ˆ b − δ) = πi(ˆ b − δ) (A.12)
and from the above argument, we have πi(b) > π1(b), for b near ˆ b − δ,
such that b > ˆ b − δ, which is a contradiction of (A.11). Then we assume that
ˆ b−δ = v
¯
1. In the symmetric auction of n strong buyers, any buyer bids above ¯ v1,
if and only if they have valuations exceeding ¯ v1. Therefore, pii(¯ v1) ≥ Fi(¯ v1) ≥
F1(¯ v1) = pii(¯ v1) and so from(A.11), (A.12) holds.We conclude Fi(¯ v1) = F1(¯ v1)
and so ¯ v1 = ¯ vi = ¯ v. Thus from part 2 of Corollary2, we have Fi(¯ v) = F1(¯ v) = 0,
and if γ > ¯ v, then
F1(v) = λFi(v), for all v ∈ [v
¯
,γ].
Since from (2.11) yi(b) = y1(b) for b in some neighborhood of ¯ v, πi(b) >
π1(b) in that neighborhood, which is a contradiction of (A.11). Hence γ = ¯ v.
From part 1 of Lemma 1, πi(b) > π1(b) for all b in a neighborhood of ¯ v, a
contradiction of (A.11). We conclude that ˆ b ∈ [v
¯
1,µi] does not exist, and so
part 1 is established.
To establish part 2, suppose that there existsˆ b ∈ (b∗,b∗) such that p1(ˆ b)/pi(ˆ b) =




























pi at b = ˆ b, or p1/pi is increasing at ˆ b. Since the
same argument applies to any b0 > ˆ b for which p1(b0)/pi(b0) = 1, we have
p1(b) > pi(b) for all b ∈ (ˆ b,b∗). But from (2.9), p1(b∗) = pi(b∗), and so ˆ b can not
21exist. Hence part2 holds unless p1(b) > pi(b) for all b ∈ (b∗,b∗), which would
conﬂict with part 2 of Lemma 1.
To prove part 3, suppose that there exists ˆ b ∈ (b∗,b∗) such that πi(ˆ b)/p1(ˆ b) =
1. If µi ≤ ˆ b, then πi(ˆ b) = p1(ˆ b) = 1 and p1(ˆ b < 1, a contradiction. Hence,
























































p1 at b = ˆ b.
The rest of the proof parallels that of part 1 but uses part 3 instead of part 1
of Lemma 1.
To prove part 4, for ˆ b ∈ (b∗,µ1) we have 1 = pi(ˆ b) > π1(ˆ b). Suppose
that there exists ˆ b ∈ (b∗,b∗) such that pi(ˆ b)/π1(ˆ b) = 1. From part 2, we have


















Following argument, which is similar to that of part 3, establishes part 4. k
Proof of Proposition 2
For b ∈ [µi,µ1], 1 = yi(b) > y1(b). For b ∈ [v
¯
1,µi], CSD implies that part 1
immediately follows from (2.15).
To establish part 2, we ﬁrst argue that part 2 holds in a punctured neigh-
borhood of b∗. If ¯ vi < ¯ v1, this is immediate because ¯ vi = φi(b∗) < φ1(b∗) = ¯ v1.






















1 at b = b∗.
(A.13)
Given CSD, it follows that φ0
1 < φ0
i and so part 2 holds in a punctured neigh-
borhood of b∗, as claimed.
Suppose that there exists ˆ b ∈ (b∗,b∗) such that φi(ˆ b)/φ1(ˆ b) = 1. Then (A.13)
holds at b = ˆ b. Hence, the assumption of CSD implies that φi(ˆ b)/φ1(ˆ b) ≥ 1 for
all b ∈ (ˆ b,b∗), a contradiction of our former ﬁnding. Thus φi(ˆ b)/φ1(ˆ b) < 1 for
all b ∈ (b∗,b∗).
To prove part 3, for any b ∈ (b∗,b∗) such that yi(b) < φi(b), from (2.8),
































By (A.14), Fi(yi)(b)/Fi(φi)(b) is strictly increasing at b = ˆ b, hence





for all b ∈ [b∗,b∗) (A.15)




i = b∗, we have φi(b∗) = yi(b∗) = b∗, a contradiction
of (A.15). We conclude that ˆ b can not exist, and so part 3 holds.
To prove part 4, note ﬁrst that, by Corollary 3, b∗ ≤ µ1. Hence φ1(b∗) ≥
y1(b∗).
For any b ∈ (v
¯
1,b∗) such that φ1(b∗) ≤ y1(b∗), from (2.8), (2.11) and part 2













































































The rest of proof is similar to that of part 3. k
Proof of Proposition 3
As deﬁned in (2.12), ¯ v1 is the equilibrium bid of player 1 in symmetric case.
From Corollary 4, we have
23RAs
1 (v,F1,Fi) = maxb p
n−1
i (b)(v − b)
≥ p
n−1
i (¯ b1(v))(v −¯ b1(v))
> π
n−1
1 (¯ b1)(v)(v −¯ b1(v))
= RS
1(v,F1,F1)
We deﬁne bi(·) as the equilibrium bid of the weak buyer in asymmetric case,
i.e. bi(·) maximizes RAs
i (v,F1,Fi). Then we have
RS
i (v,Fi,Fi) = π
n−1
i (¯ bi)(v −¯ bi)
≥ π
n−1
i (bi)(v − bi)
> p
n−2




Proof of Proposition 4
Firstly we compare RAs and RS
1.
From subsection (1)and(2), We have
















Given the assumption in this proposition, i.e. neglecting the diﬀerences
between integral upper and lower bounds, from Corollary 4 F
n−1
i (φi(b)) >
F1(φ1(b)) > F1(y1(b)), it is easy to obtain that RS
1 > RAs. Similarly, we obtain
others results in this proposition. k
Proof of Lemma 2
From the expression of RAs


















Then we can obtain
RAs














From (2.8), we have d




Substituting this expression into the integral and using the deﬁnition φ1(b) ≡
Q(φi(b)) , we then obtain
24RAs





























Since from (2.8) we have d
db[bF
n−2













































From this expression it is easy to obtain that one in Lemma. k
Proof of Lemma 3























Taking the expectation over vi,












































i (v)d[v(1 − Fi(v))]




















25From this expression, it is easy to obtain the Lemma.















Taking the expectation over v1,
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